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Abstract
This paper examines whether the subjective well-being of migrants is responsive to uc-
tuations in macroeconomic conditions in their country of origin. Using the German Socio-
Economic Panel for the years 1984 to 2009 and macroeconomic variables for 24 countries of
origin, we exploit country-year variation for identication of the e¤ect and panel data to con-
trol for migrantsobserved and unobserved characteristics. We nd strong (mild) evidence
that migrantswell-being responds negatively (positively) to an increase in the GDP (un-
employment rate) of their home country. That is, we originally demonstrate that migrants
regard home countries as natural comparators and, thereby, suggest an original assessment
of the migrations relative deprivation motive. We also show that migrants are positively
a¤ected by the performances of the German regions in which they live (a signal e¤ect).
We demonstrate that both e¤ects decline with years-since-migration and with the degree of
assimilation in Germany, which is consistent with a switch of migrantsreference point from
home countries to migration destinations. Results are robust to the inclusion of country-
time trends, to control for remittances sent to relatives in home countries and to a correction
for selection into return migration. We derive important implications for labor market and
migration policies.
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1 Introduction
Studies using self-reported measures of life satisfaction as proxies for utility have rapidly developed
during the last decade (see the reviews of Frey and Stutzer, 2002; or Clark et al., 2008). This new
branch of the economic literature allows for testing important determinants of individual well-
being that could not be easily studied with the revealed preference approach. For instance, this is
the case with the "macroeconomics of happiness", i.e., how movements in GDP, unemployment or
ination directly a¤ect individual happiness (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Oswald, 1997; Di Tella et
al., 2001, 2003; Wolfers, 2003). This literature has also established the importance of status and
positional concerns, notably the inuence of a persons relative income compared to a reference
group on her welfare.1
While it is di¢ cult to identify the relevant reference point for a given population, migrants o¤er
an interesting case study. Indeed, they are confronted with di¤erent potential reference groups
among which two are natural comparators, namely their countries or regions of origin and the
regions of destination. While there is some evidence regarding the role of positional concerns
within a country,2 the impact of home-country economic performances on the well-being of in-
ternational migrants is, to date, not investigated. This question is not only relevant to measure
the determinants of migrantswell-being. It could also shed light on the international dimension
of life satisfaction, on the assimilation process of international migrants and on the migration
decision itself. In particular, the closely related concept of relative deprivation is often cited in
the migration literature to explain the very choice of migrating (e.g., Stark and Taylor, 1991).3
To our knowledge, the literature has not yet studied relative deprivation (and the net gains from
migrating) using subjective well-being measures as well as whether home countries are relevant
reference points for international migrants.
This study aims to ll this gap by providing the rst investigation of whether migrants are sensitive
to the economic performances of both their home country and destination locations. Using the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we exploit time and home country variation to identify
the e¤ects of macroeconomic uctuations on migrantswell-being. Germany is interesting for at
least two reasons. First, it has one of the highest population of immigrants in Western countries,
1See Easterlin (1995) and evidence from neuroscience (Dohmen et al., 2011), experimental economics (Johansson-
Stenman et al., 2002) or subjective well-being (e.g., McBride, 2001, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005, Luttmer, 2005, Senik
2004, Clark and Senik, 2010, among others).
2For instance, Akay et al. (2012) show that rural-to-urban migrants in China have strong competing feelings
towards their home regions.
3That is, migration is being undertaken because it can improve a persons income relative to members of her
reference group, which in this literature is assumed to be other income-earning persons in the source country or
source community.
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with almost 13% of the total population coming from various countries of the Eurasian conti-
nent (a total of 10:7 million migrants from 194 countries live in Germany). Second, the GSOEP
is a large representative dataset including subjective well-being (SWB) measures, very detailed
individual and household information, a panel dimension and excellent representativeness of mi-
grants. Additionally, we recover information on macroeconomic conditions over 26 years for 24
origin countries that correspond to the largest migrant communities in Germany.4 This informa-
tion is combined with migrantsSWB and other individual characteristics from the GSOEP. We
then estimate migrantsSWB on a large set of individual determinants of well-being (household
income, health status, etc.) and the macroeconomic variables of home countries, while accounting
for migrantsfamily circumstances in both the host and home countries, individual time-invariant
unobservables, time trends, country xed e¤ects, arrival cohort and German states xed e¤ects.
Our results are robust to the inclusion of country-specic time trends, the amount of remittances
sent to relatives in home countries and a correction for possible non-random selection into return
migration.
Exploiting the unique setting o¤ered by migrants, this study contributes to the literature with at
least three ndings: it originally shows that home countries indeed act as a natural comparator for
migrants, it highlights the existence of multiple reference points, and it indicates possible switches
in reference groups over the years-since-migration or sorting across migrants depending on their
degree of assimilation. The rst point is our main result: we nd a marked and statistically
robust e¤ect of the home countriesmacroeconomic conditions on migrants well-being. It is
fully in line with the relative concerns/deprivation hypothesis, i.e., migrantswell-being decreases
with home country GDP per capita. The second contribution starts with the nding of an e¤ect
of opposite direction regarding local economic performances, i.e., migrantswell-being increases
along with the GDP of the German counties in which they live. We interpret it as signal e¤ect,
i.e., destination regions with greater economic success indicate higher chances of prosperity for
migrants in the future. The third nding is obtained when estimating an heterogeneous e¤ect
of GDP on migrantswell-being, along dimensions like years-since-migration and objective and
subjective measures of the degree of assimilation in Germany. We unveil that competing feelings
4Another recent study, Nekoei (2013), exploits time and origin-country variation to study the e¤ect of exchange
rate volatility on migrantslabor supply in the US. The author uses 16 years of the Current Population Survey and 73
countries of origin. Our study also relates to Di Tella et al. (2001, 2003). These authors do not focus on migrants
especially; they study the correlation between all citizensSWB and the countrys macroeconomic uctuations.
They use individual data collected from 12 European countries between 1975-1991 and from the United States
between 1972-1994. They report that GDP (unemployment and ination) is positively (negatively) associated with
citizenswell-being. They explain this correlation with feelings of national prestige (for GDP), corroding purchasing
power (for ination) and loss of self-esteem, depression, anxiety and social stigma (for unemployment). See also Di
Tella and MacCulloch (2008) and Frey and Stutzer (2002).
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towards home countries decrease after some years in the host country. Consistently, less assimilated
migrants keep strong transnational ties, and origin countries are likely to remain their key reference
group. Our conclusions are reinforced by the nding that the signal e¤ect from German regions
where migrants live also declines with years-since-migration. Indeed, it is likely that this e¤ect is
gradually replaced by relative concerns, i.e., the "local league" becomes the new reference point.
We derive important labor market and migration policy implications from these results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the empirical methodology.
Section 3 reports the main results, robustness checks and additional results using migrantshet-
erogeneity. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Approach
2.1 Data and Selection
Our analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a well-known survey of
individuals in households living in Germany. It has been used in important analyses in the SWB
literature (see, e.g., van Praag et al., 2003; Frijters et al., 2004a, 2004b; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).
It is a representative survey of the entire German population with about 25; 000 individuals per
wave and an exceptionally long panel, of which we are using 26 years from 1984 to 2009. It
contains a wealth of information at the individual or household level, including data on education,
health, labor market conditions and incomes, as well as various subjective measures of well-being.
The dataset was started in 1984 in West Germany and has covered the entire reunited Germany
since 1990. The latest survey we use was conducted in 2009 and we shall verify in our robustness
checks whether the two years of recession (2008-2009) have a specic e¤ect on our results.5
In each wave, the survey asks the question "How satised are you with your life as a whole, all
things considered?". The answer is then recoded on an 11-point scale (0 signies "completely
dissatised" and 10 means "completely satised"). Life satisfaction is highly correlated with other
subjective measures of well-being like self-reported happiness or aggregated answers about mental
health such as the GHQ-12 (see Clark and Oswald, 1994). Most importantly, Clark et al. (2008)
and Frey and Stutzer (2002) recall that SWB information is a solid proxy for individual well-being
as demonstrated by its use among psychologists and other social scientists over the past thirty
years, as well as by the strong correlation with further objective measures of mental well-being
5Sample weights are provided and used to guarantee the representativeness of the sample. Representativeness of
the migrant population is found to be excellent in the detailed assessment of Lelkes and Zolyom (2010). Attrition
in GSOEP is discussed in Spiess and Kroh (2004) and, in relation with SWB estimations, in Frijters et al. (2004b).
Non-random attrition due to return migration is addressed in our analysis below.
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(evidence from neuroscience, validation exercises on the tendency to smile genuinely, to commit
suicide, to be rated as happy by friends and relatives; see Oswald and Wu, 2010). Krueger and
Schkade (2008) provide extensive evidence about the robustness of SWB measures compared to
more usual data used by economists. Di Tella et al. (2003) also report the high regularity observed
in SWB equation regressions across di¤erent nations (as we do below for the di¤erent migrant
groups in our data). Finally, the lack of interpersonal comparability in the perception of (and
answers about) well-being should not be a concern: like any other source of measurement error, it
is addressed by using large samples and, additionally, by controlling for individual xed e¤ects in
SWB regressions. Equivalent income measures can also be derived, o¤ering a more interpretable
and (interpersonal) comparable index of well-being.
We select all the waves of the GSOEP, keeping all adult rst-generation immigrants aged 16
or older and living in West or East Germany. Although more than a hundred nationalities are
reported, we restrict our study to the main migration groups, resulting in 24 di¤erent countries
of origin. These correspond to the largest groups in terms of their population size in Germany
and countries for which we have at least 100 observations in the data. We combine our GSOEP
selection with macroeconomic variables for the migrants24 countries, drawn from annual time
series data of the World Bank indicators. We focus on the main variables of interest, including log
real GDP per capita of country h in year t (denoted GDPh;t hereafter), growth in real GDP per
capita (denoted GDP ), log nominal GDP per capita (denoted GDP nomh;t ), price levels measured
by the GDP deator (Ph;t) and unemployment rates.6 The resulting sample includes a total of
51; 171 individualyear observations obtained over 26 years of data and migrants from 24 origin
countries.7 We lose a small fraction of this dataset due to missing information so that our nal
sample contains 47; 557 individualyear observations. In the following, we suggest estimations
based on this microdata as well as grouped estimations on a sample of 556 countryyear points.8
6See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.
7For a comparison, DiTella et al. (2003) use 17 years of data and individuals from 13 countries to capture
enough regional and time variation in macroeconomic conditions
8We do not have observations in GSOEP for 1 year (5, 5, 6 and 10 years) in Iran (Portugal, Russia Ukraine
and Kazakhstan respectively), which makes 27 country  year observations missing. We have checked that the
conclusions of this study hold when excluding these countries completely. In addition, macroeconomic variables
are not reported in World Bank Indicators for 6 years in Poland, Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia and the Czech
Republic, 1 year for Russia and 10 years for Bosnia, leading to another 41 missing points. Again, we have veried
that our results are consistently similar when using linear extrapolation or other sources to ll in the missing GDP
or unemployment information. Our baseline nonetheless relies on the original sample. The total of 68 missing
points corresponds to 10:9% of the 26 24 = 624 country  year sample used for grouped estimations below. This
proportion is smaller in terms of individualyear observations (7:1%) due to the fact that missing points a¤ect
countries that are below the average country size.
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2.2 A First Look at the Data
Table A.1 in the Appendix provides some statistics for the main macroeconomic indices (real
GDP per capita expressed in PPP-adjusted 2005 international dollars, nominal GDP per capita
and unemployment rates in columns 1, 2 and 4) and SWB (average value by country of origin over
all migrants in GSOEP, in column 5), using mean values over the period 1984 to 2009. The last
row shows the gures for Germany as a comparison point. We also provide the ratio of real GDP
per capita for each country compared to Germany (column 3). This reects the huge variation in
development levels across immigration countries. For instance, the di¤erence is as little as 30%
(resp. 28%) of the German real (resp. nominal) GDP per capita for Iran and up to 113% (resp.
99%) for the Netherlands. A lot of variation can also be observed concerning reported well-being.
On the 0   10 scale, SWB scores 7:1 on average over all years and countries. Using the country
average over 1984-2009, we see that SWB varies from 5:8 for Iranian migrants to 7:6 for Dutch
migrants, partly reecting the large variation in living conditions (as proxied by GDPh;t) across
nations. This is illustrated by the cross-country correlation between mean SWB and absolute real
GDP (resp. unemployment rate), i.e., :46 (resp  :40). However, di¤erences in income levels do
not perfectly explain the well-being gap. The relationship between income and well-being may
not be linear: beyond a certain income level, income di¤erences have smaller e¤ects on perceived
well-being (this pattern is found in Easterlin, 1995, but questioned more recently by Stevenson
and Wolfers, 2008, who do not reject linearity). For instance, the correlation between mean SWB
and real GDP per capita is smaller when GDP is expressed in logs (:36). Moreover, if we focus on
Western European countries and the US, this correlation drops to :07.
Next, we report country-specic correlations between yearly SWB and GDP (resp. unemploy-
ment), in column 6 (resp. 7) of Table A.1. We use variation in annual SWB (calculated as the
mean SWB over all migrants of a country for a given year) and GDP over time. Interestingly,
for GDP (resp. unemployment), the correlations are negative (resp. positive) in the majority of
countries, as if increases in GDP per capita (resp. unemployment) were associated with a decline
(resp. rise) in the well-being of the corresponding migrants. This unexpected result is illustrated
in Figures 1 and 2 for the ve largest migrant groups (those from Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain and
Poland). That is, we plot log real GDP per capita (Figure 1) and unemployment rates (Figure 2)
against mean SWB for all our panel years. While GDP increases steadily over the period, SWB
shows a clear declining trend. That is, the negative relationship between home country GDP and
migrantsSWB seems to characterize the whole period (with a few exceptions) and most immi-
gration countries.9 The pattern for unemployment rates is not as pronounced as it is for GDP.
9This result is not only driven by the periods of economic growth. While not visible in Figure 1, we observe in
source data that, for instance, the downturns of 1993-1994 and 2000-2001 in Turkey or the 2008-2009 recession in
Italy are associated with an increase in SWB among migrants from these countries.
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Yet overall, it seems as though increases in unemployment rates are associated with an increase
in SWB.
These preliminary results directly align with the interpretation in terms of relative concerns/deprivation
suggested in the introduction. With the Easterlin paradox (Easterlin, 1995), the fact that a coun-
try like Germany has experienced GDP growth yet a at trend in SWB over the past 30 years
often pertains to the classic explanation in terms of "positionality". That is, after some point,
well-being would depend more on relative income than on absolute income, so that absolute in-
creases in national wealth would not improve well-being over time. For migrants, one could in
fact expect an even more radically opposed trend between GDP and SWB, i.e., a negative corre-
lation as we illustrate here. Migrantsreference points for relative concerns are indeed countries
which are more often poorer than Germany. If these countries "catch up" with Germany due to
higher growth rates (for instance in Turkey), the relative position of migrants declines over time
compared to their countrys living standards, and thus, their SWB is negatively a¤ected. In the
sequel, we attempt to characterize these e¤ects by means of regressions on grouped or micro data
and controlling for additional variables.10
2.3 Modeling the Well-being of Migrants
Estimations on Grouped Data. We begin our analysis by estimating the relationship between
key macroeconomic measures and SWB using grouped data. That is, we produce a dataset of 556
countryyear points as described above, using the mean SWB over all migrants in a country-year
cell. At this stage, we aim to examine the magnitudes, signs and the statistical signicance of the
macroeconomic indices while exploiting time variation but without controlling for any individual
variation. We estimate the following model:
SWBht = Xht+ Macroht + ht (1)
with ht = h + t + "ht
or ht = h + t + ht + "ht:
where SWBht is the mean subjective well-being over all migrants of origin country h in year
t. We use di¤erent home country-specic macroeconomic variables Macroht as discussed in the
10Note that when the negative relationship between SWB and GDP over time is cumulated with the positive
relationship across countries, we obtain a positive but moderate correlation of 0:204 (second to last row of Table
A.1). As shown in the following, this positive sign does not hold when further controlling for migrants income
levels and other individual characteristics. That is, the negative e¤ect of home country GDP on well-being may well
be obtained by time variation within countries, as shown with aggregated trends above, but also when accounting
for cross-country variation.
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Figure 1: SWB versus GDP: Time Trends
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Figure 2: SWB versus Unemployment: Time Trends
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previous section. In our favorite specication, we also control for a set Xht of mean characteristics
of migrants from country h observed in year t, which include average age, marital status, work
status, health status, household income and time spent in Germany (years-since-migration). The
composite error term ht is discussed below.
Estimations on Micro Data. Using our selected panel of migrants living in Germany, we
estimate the well-being SWB of migrant i from home country h at time t as follows:
SWBiht = Xit+ Macroht + iht (2)
with iht = h + t + 'i + "iht
or iht = h + t + ht + 'i + "iht:
Latent well-being SWB is considered as a proxy for the unobserved utility of a migrant, for
which we observe an ordinal metric SWBiht = j on an ordered scale of well-being categories
j = 1; :::J . The model combines both characteristics of migrant i at year t,Xit, and macroeconomic
variables of her home country h at year t, Macroht. Individual time-varying variables in Xit
include the usual determinants of SWB, i.e., age, marital status and family circumstances, work
status, health status, log household income and years-since-migration (which may capture the
role of assimilation in overall well-being). We also include German states (Länder) as means to
account for possible migration patterns within Germany (evidence in GSOEP shows, however, that
geographical mobility of migrants is extremely limited, see Akay et al., 2013). Finally, we control
for time-invariant variables including gender and cohort e¤ects. Migrants may vary in unobservable
characteristics depending on the year they arrived in Germany (Borjas, 1999). Therefore, migrants
are grouped into 9 cohorts taken 5 years apart (9 dummy variables starting from pre-1960 arrivals
until the last cohort corresponding to the last 10 years). These cohort dummies aim to capture
cohort-specic unobserved characteristics a¤ecting migrantswell-being.11
Stochastic Specication and Estimations Methods. The residual term is specied in a
similar way in models (1) and (2). It includes home country xed e¤ects h (for unchanging
cultural inuences of origin country on reported well-being), time trends t (for any global shocks
that are common to all countries in each year), and a usual i.i.d error term, "ht in (1) and "iht
in (2). For a robustness check, we augment our basic specication with country-specic time
11Grouping is necessary for identication. Indeed, there are four time dimensions: migrantsage, duration of
stay in Germany (years-since-migration), year dummies (year of observation) and cohorts (year of arrival). The
last three cannot be identied without additional assumptions, since the year of observation minus the year of
arrival equals years-since-migration. Our choice is therefore to introduce age (a usual determinant of SWB), years-
since-migration (which is correlated with the level of assimilation) and time trends in the most exible way while
reducing cohorts to grouped e¤ects.
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trends ht = h  t. This may capture, for instance, cultural attitude toward changes in well-
being or country-specic unobservable assimilation patterns of migrants of country h. Di Tella
et al. (2003) stress that for usual unit-root reasons, untrended SWB should not be regressed on
trended macroeconomic indices like GDP. Deterministic functions of time are used to render the
data stationary. This is accounted for by general time trends t and, in the robustness checks, by
the inclusion of the country-specic time trends ht (this point is further discussed in the results
section). Microdata estimations using model (2) additionally include an individual e¤ect 'i that
accounts for time-invariant unobservables (xed or random e¤ects). Our baseline estimations rely
on the Mundlak-Chamberlain "correlated e¤ects" model, also known as the "quasi-xed e¤ects"
(QFE) model. The auxiliary distribution of individual e¤ects is specied using within-means for
the following time-variant variables: household income, household size, age, amount of remittances
sent to the home country, education and working hours. Most importantly, this model allows for
the inclusion of individual e¤ects without losing crucial xed e¤ects, such as country e¤ects,
German states and immigrant arrival cohorts. Fixed e¤ects (FE) estimations are also conducted
for a comparison.
Finally, the ordinal nature of the dependent variable in model (2) requires a brief discussion
regarding the appropriate estimation method. In fact, we consider that J = 10 is large enough
to treat reported well-being as a continuous variable so that (2) can be estimated linearly. The
advantage of the linear approach is that it makes the required extensions to panel estimations
much more transparent and allows including unobserved individual heterogeneity in a exible way
(Diener et al., 1999). Notwithstanding, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) show that results
are typically similar using both linear and ordinal models, a conclusion that is shared in the
present study. In addition, we provide checks where we acknowledge the ordinal nature of the
dependent variable. We also allow for unobserved individual e¤ects in this nonlinear context by
using the QFE ordered probit and the "Blow-up and Cluster" FE ordered logit estimators (see
Baetschmann et al., 2011).
3 Results
3.1 Estimations on Grouped Data
We rst begin with the linear estimation of model (1) on grouped data, i.e., ignoring individual
variation in the GSOEP. Because we control for country dummies h, the e¤ect we obtain over
all countryyear cells can be interpreted as a within-group e¤ect. In Table 1, we simply report
estimates for , which is the impact of the macroeconomic variables on SWB. We focus on the
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two main macroeconomic indicators: log real GDP per capita (GDPh;t) and unemployment.12
E¤ect of GDP. Column I reports the coe¢ cient on GDPh;t. The parameter estimate is negative
and highly signicant, with a magnitude of  :668 and a standard error of 0:204. An increase in
the home countrys GDP per capita is negatively correlated with migrantswell-being, conditional
on country and year xed e¤ects. These preliminary results may indicate a negative e¤ect of home
country performances on migrantswell-being, yet we do not claim any causal interpretation at this
stage. Also, this estimation assumes a common time trend in SWB after controlling for country-
specic macroeconomic variables. In column II, we suggest another estimation that accounts for
country-specic time trends of SWB. The relationship betweenGDPh;t and SWB is hardly a¤ected,
as the coe¢ cient is  :583 and still signicant at the 5% level. This is all the more remarkable
as such a specication demands much from the data. It is nonetheless a necessary check, as
argued by Di Tella et al. (2003). Indeed, as macroeconomic indices such as GDP are time-trended
while SWB is usually untrended (Easterlin, 1995), regressing the latter on the former generates
concerns of costationarity. In our sample of migrants, we have observed a small downward trend
in life satisfaction. We nonetheless account for time trends t in the estimation to reduce this
concern. Including countryyear e¤ects and hence accounting for possible di¤erences in slope
across source countries should eliminate it.
Moreover, the GDP e¤ect could also be spurious if country-specic time e¤ects, and in particular
the e¤ect of years-since-migration, were misspecied and picked up by the GDP trend. While
country-specic time trends eliminate this, we have checked that our results are not sensitive
to using exible specications of years-since-migration in a model without country-specic time
e¤ects (our specication in the rest of the paper is a quadratic form of years-since-migration).
A nal check has consisted in using the Hodrick-Prescott lter to detrend the macroeconomic
variables before estimation. This approach ensures that the results are not due to trend generating
spurious correlation between GDP and SWB (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). Using a specication
where we also include time dummies, we obtain an e¤ect of  :722 (standard deviation of :357)
for detrended GDP per capita in levels and  :534 (:312) for detrended GDP per capita in logs.
These are statistically signicant and the log GDP e¤ect is close to the baseline estimate.
Interpretation and Comparisons. There are several ways to judge the magnitude of the
e¤ect. Results of column I can be interpreted as follows: Given that SWB and GDPh;t have a
total standard deviation equal to 1:78 and :17 respectively (cf. Table A.1), then a one standard
deviation increase in GDPh;t (which is around a 2% increase compared to the mean) accounts
for a decline of 6:4% of a standard deviation in SWB (or a 1:6% decrease in mean SWB). This
12In all the estimations hereafter, we use the log of real GDP per capita divided by 10; 000, for comparability
with Di Tella et al. (2003).
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gure is 5:6% when we control for country-specic time trends. While this may seem modest, it
is very much in line with measures of relative concerns or socio-economic status in the literature.
For instance, Di Tella et al. (2010) nd that a one standard deviation change in status (i.e., an
individuals relative standing to others measured by job prestige) explains 3:1% of the standard
deviation in well-being, and that this e¤ect is about half the size of a one standard deviation
decrease in log household income. In our case, an alternatively way to gauge the e¤ect is precisely
to take the ratio of the coe¢ cient on log GDP per capita over the coe¢ cient on log household
income in order to calculate an equivalent income variation. The coe¢ cient on the log household
income (averaged over all migrants of each country) varies between :37 and :31 depending on the
model specication (respectively without and with country-specic time trends).13 Taking the
ratio of the coe¢ cients on log GDP and log household income, we obtain an equivalent income
of around  1:8 in models I and II (see lower panel of Table 1), i.e., a 1% increase in the home
countrys real GDP per capita is equivalent to a 1:8% decrease in household income. Drawing
from estimates of absolute and relative income e¤ects in the literature, we nd smaller equivalent
income measures of relative concerns, yet in the same order of magnitude, i.e.,  :58,  :76,  :82 in
Akay and Martinsson (2011), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) and Luttmer (2005) respectively. Larger
values are found in Akay et al. (2012) for Chinese internal migrants as the SWB change due to
a 1% increase in the mean income of rural regions of origin is equivalent to a 3:3% decrease in
rural-to-urban migrantshousehold income.
E¤ects of Unemployment. Our relative concerns/deprivation interpretation could apply to
other macroeconomic variables and notably to unemployment. Market failures that constrain labor
market and earnings opportunities in the home land may increase the attractiveness of migration
both as a potential avenue for e¤ective gains in relative incomes and a source of satisfaction for
those who have already migrated. Column III in Table 1 presents the e¤ect of the home-country
unemployment rate. This e¤ect is signicantly positive, which is consistent with the interpretation
above and the ndings regarding GDP. This e¤ect is robust to controlling for home country-specic
time trends (column IV). When including GDPh;t in the same regression (column V), both home
country log GDP per capita and unemployment e¤ects keep the sign and magnitude that they had
in independent estimations. Admittedly, there is a small decrease in the magnitude of the GDP
e¤ect, likely due to the substantial correlation that exists between these macroeconomic variables
( :36). Notwithstanding, this e¤ect is remarkably robust. Both e¤ects become slightly smaller
13This is similar to comparison studies like Akay and Martinsson (2011), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer
(2005), McBride (2001) or Di Tella et al. (2010) who report :36, :25, :12, :13 and :20 respectively. For (rural-to-
urban Chinese) migrants, Akay et al. (2012) report :10. Note the nding of similar or even larger relative income
e¤ects compared to absolute income e¤ects is not unusual (see for instance Senik, 2008; Akay et al. 2012; or
McBride, 2001).
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when country-specic time trends are included (column VI). In terms of equivalent income, the
GDP e¤ect in column V (resp. VI) corresponds to a 1:22% (resp. 1:28%) decrease in the mean
household income.
Table 1: E¤ect of Home-Country Macroeconomics on Migrant SWB: Grouped Estimations
SWB grouped estimations
GDP -0.668 *** -0.583 ** -0.525 ** -0.468 *
(0.204) (0.256) (0.206) (0.259)
Unemployment rate 0.040 *** 0.030 *** 0.035 *** 0.027 **
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home country-specific trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
GDP (equivalent income) -1.81 -1.85 -1.23 -1.28
R2 0.583 0.671 0.587 0.673 0.593 0.676
# observations 556 556 556 556 556 556
V VI
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDP refers to log of real GDP per capita. GDP and
unemployment rates taken from World Bank indicators. Subjective well-being (SWB) averaged per country of origin x year, taken
from the German Socio-Economic Panel. Linear estimations performed on migrants from 24 countries over 26 years, weighted by
countryxyear cell size.
I II III IV
3.2 Estimations on Micro Data
Previous estimates suggest that macroeconomic performances within migrantshome countries
could a¤ect their well-being in a way which is consistent with relative concerns/deprivation.
Grouped estimations avoid much of the noise surrounding data on individual SWB data. In
particular, individual di¤erences regarding the perception of ones own SWB are averaged up.
However, grouping observations in a pseudo-panel does not allow us to control for migrantsindi-
vidual heterogeneity, which potentially plays an important role. Thus we move to our main results,
namely the estimation of model (2) which accounts for the true panel nature of the sample. It
relates the macroeconomic conditions of home countries to individual SWB conditional on various
individual and family circumstances in both the host and home countries. Estimates of coe¢ cient
 are reported in Tables 2 and 3 for GDPh;t, and Table 4 for unemployment.
E¤ect of GDP: Baseline Estimations. Before discussing our core results, we undertake a
brief discussion of the complete set of estimates for equation (2), as reported in Appendix Table
A.2. We distinguish between personal determinants of SWB, individual characteristics related to
home countries and macroeconomic variables. For simplicity, we only report three specications:
one without GDP, one with GDP and one with GDP and dummies for country-specic time trends.
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All specications control for migration cohort, German state, home country and year e¤ects, as
well as individual unobserved heterogeneity using the Mundlak-Chamberlain QFE in a linear
model. Model 0 contains only personal characteristics as in standard SWB regressions, in order
to check the signs and signicance of the usual socio-economic and demographic characteristics.
Results are in line with standard ndings in the literature (as surveyed in Frey and Stutzer, 2002;
or Clark et al. 2008).14 We have also run separate regressions for each country and nd that life
satisfaction estimates have a broadly common structure overall (detailed results are available from
the authors). The impact of variables like age, income, health, marital status and children is very
comparable and stable across countries of origin. This regularity suggests that SWB data contain
reliable and potentially interesting information for welfare measurement (see also Di Tella et al.,
2003).
In models I and II of Appendix Table A.2, we additionally include home country log real GDP
per capita (GDPh;t) to comply with the baseline specication in equation (2). We rst observe
that the signs and signicance of individual characteristics are not a¤ected much by the inclusion
of this macroeconomic variable. Most importantly, we obtain an estimate of the GDP e¤ect of
 :280, which is signicant at the 1% level.15 Model II additionally controls for country-specic
time trends, i.e., our second baseline specication in equation (2). Recall that this is an im-
portant check because country-specic time e¤ects clean out the spurious correlation between
macroeconomic indices and SWB, as previously discussed. The magnitude of the e¤ect is basi-
cally unchanged ( :224) but the e¤ect is less precisely estimated, even if still signicant at the
10% level. Alternatively, we have also used the Hodrick-Prescott lter to detrend macroeconomic
variables before estimations (detailed results available from the authors). Doing so, we obtain an
e¤ect of  :303 (standard deviation of :145) for detrended GDP per capita in levels and  :256
(:137) for GDP per capita in logs. Hence, results are still signicant in this case and the log GDP
e¤ect is of similar magnitude as in the baseline.
14Essentially, income, good health and being married are positively related to SWB while being unemployed is
negatively correlated. The pattern of SWB over the life cycle exhibits the classic U-shaped behavior, meaning
that well-being decreases until the age of 40-45 and then increases. The presence of the kids or the spouse in
Germany has strong positive e¤ects. Migrantsrefugee status does not a¤ect SWB while the level of remittances
is negatively correlated, indicating that the loss of resources endured by the migrant dominates the gains from
remitting (altruism, investment in social capital in home country, etc.). Yet it is only signicant in specications
without QFE (not reported), not when QFE includes mean remittances over all years as we model it.
15In all specications, we cluster standard errors at the individual level due to the panel nature of the data.
Alternatively, clustering is made at the year and home country level to account for possible bias due to repeated
observations for the same country of origin (and to control for the correlation between errors in the same country).
The standard errors are increased only slightly in both cases.
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Interpretations and Comparisons. This nding conrms the grouped estimations results and
suggests that macroeconomic movements in home countries feed through into migrantsfeelings
of well-being. This may be seen as an unexpected result if one believes that migrants are likely to
be bounded to home lands by a sense of pride, identity and patriotic ties; they may also be linked
altruistically or emotionally. We argue that such positive attachment and solidarity with the home
country may exist when it comes to non-economic aspects like environmental catastrophes, anti-
democratic events, conicts and social unrest, and so on (we provide some suggestive evidence in
the next section). As far as economic conditions are concerned, our results do consolidate previous
ndings in the literature showing that peoples well-being is evaluated against natural comparison
points and we show that home countries are an important one. This also relates to the fact that
mean income in home countries is a marker with respect to which migrants can gauge the success
of their migration experience. It may come to mind that such a positional concern vis-à-vis home
countries can be mitigated by the fact that some of the migrantsclose relatives still live there
and may be negatively a¤ected by macroeconomic shocks. In fact, our microdata control for close
relatives remaining in the home country and for the level of remittances sent by migrants to help
face income shocks (see Appendix Table A.2).16
Hence, the negative coe¢ cient on log GDP per capita may be seen as a reasonable measure of
(economic) relative concerns vis-à-vis the home countries. Migrants from countries characterized
by better macroeconomic performances experience lower gains from migration and, other things
being equal, lower levels of well-being. Arguably, this e¤ect may be attenuated when migrants
decide to stay forever in Germany or become assimilated enough for their reference point to
shift from home countries to other comparators within Germany. We investigate this point a
bit later. For now, we suggest a brief comparison of our results with grouped estimations and
other studies. First, point estimates are substantially smaller than in grouped estimations. A one
standard deviation increase in log GDP per capita (which is around a 2% increase in the mean)
is associated with a decline of 2:7% of a standard deviation of SWB (or a 0:7% decrease in mean
SWB). This gure is 2:2% when we control for country-specic time trends. These values are
much closer to the status e¤ect in Di Tella et al. (2010) quoted above. Nonetheless, notice that
condence intervals of estimates from grouped versus microdata estimations do overlap, i.e., the
95% interval for model I (without country-specic time trends) is for instance [ 1:07; :27] in the
former and [ :48; :08] in the latter. Second, positional concerns are now smaller in magnitude
than the e¤ect of log household income (:39 in model I and :40 in model II). This leads to the
following equivalent income calculations: a 1% increase in real GDP per capita in the home
16Whether the migrantsfamilies increase their status within the origin country as the result of remittances is an
interesting question. Yet it is beyond the scope of our research since we lack information on these familiesposition
in the origin countrys income distribution. See the discussion in the concluding section.
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country is equivalent to a :71% (resp. :56%) decrease in household income. This is smaller than
the equivalent income variations from grouped estimations but very similar to the relative concerns
measures cited above, drawn from the studies of Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Akay and Martinsson
(2011) and Luttmer (2005).17
E¤ect of GDP: Alternative Estimators and Specications. Our baseline results above
are obtained with linear estimations treating SWB as a continuous variable including QFE à
la Mundlak. In the previous section, we have justied the choice of this estimation approach, yet
we now investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to alternative estimators. Baseline
estimates for the GDP e¤ect are again reported in columns I and II of Table 2, without and
with country-specic time trends respectively (we report both point estimates and the equivalent
income e¤ect). In column III, we acknowledge the ordinal nature of observed SWB data (0  10
scale) and use an ordered probit model. Results are very similar to the baseline ( 0:215) and
signicant at the 1% level.
In addition, we can replace Mundlak QFE by standard individual xed e¤ects (FE). This is done
in column IV using linear estimation and in column V using a discrete model (the "Blow-up and
Cluster" FE ordered logit). Reassuringly, the e¤ect is still strong and signicant in both cases.
Notice that the interpretation of parameter estimates is di¤erent in these models. If we reason in
a time-demeaned linear model, age and year e¤ects are not separately identied. Also, important
time-invariant characteristics such as country xed e¤ects, immigration cohorts and German states
(to the extent that within-Germany mobility is close to nil) are swept away together with variables
such as gender or refugee status. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the e¤ect is similar to previous
ndings in the linear estimation ( 0:277). In contrast, the coe¢ cient becomes twice as large with
the FE ordered logit ( 0:479). In fact, the coe¢ cient on log household income also increases in
this case (:48 compared to :38 in FE linear estimations). Consequently, equivalent income e¤ects
are not much larger than in the baseline:  :73 using model III and  :99 in model IV, compared
to  :71 with model I.
A possibly harmless way to control for individual heterogeneity in SWB estimations is to use
information on personal traits. Psychological traits are increasingly used as a time-invariant and
potentially important determinant of well-being (Boyce, 2010) or used to account for individual
di¤erences in SWB perception (see Bollinger et al., 2012). We enrich the QFE linear model with
the so-called "big ve" personality traits reported in waves 2004 and 2009. Results are reported
in column VI of Table 2.18 The e¤ect is again very stable, with a signicant negative coe¢ cient
of a similar magnitude to past results ( :321) and a similar equivalent income e¤ect ( :86).
17That country level coe¢ cients are greater than the micro level coe¢ cients may indicate the presence of country
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Table 2: E¤ect of Home-country GDP on Migrant SWB: Micro Data
SWB micro estimations
GDP (coefficient) -0.281 *** -0.224 * -0.215 *** -0.277 ** -0.479 ** -0.321 ***
(0.104) (0.130) (0.057) (0.110) (0.188) (0.122)
Individual effects (a) QFE QFE QFE FE FE
Cohort fixed effects (b) Yes Yes Yes n.a. n.a. Yes
State fixed effects (c) Yes Yes Yes n.a. n.a. Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes n.a. n.a. Yes
Home country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes n.a. n.a. Yes
Home country-specific trends No Yes No No No No
Estimation method linear linear oprobit linear ologit linear
GDP (equivalent income) -0.714 -0.562 -0.689 -0.729 -0.991 -0.860
R2 or pseudo-R2 0.284 0.285 0.085 0.192 0.103 0.305
# observations 47,557 47,557 47,557 47,557 47,557 25,306
VI
QFE#
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Estimations performed on migrants from 24
countries over 26 years, standard errors clustered at the individual level. GDP refers to log of real GDP per capita, taken from
World Bank indicators. Subjective well-being (SWB) taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel. All models include the full
set observed characteristics reported in appendix Table A.2 (except time-invariant characteristics in models IV and V). (a)
Unobserved individual effects are taken into account using quasi-fixed effects (QFE), QFE with big-five personality traits
(QFE#) or fixed effects (FE). With FE, year fixed effects are not identified since we include age in the covariates. Other
individual effects are: (b) 10 arrival cohort effects, (c) 16 federal states of Germany.
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E¤ect of GDP: Timing and Adaptation. Table 3 reports additional results. The rst
investigation concerns the timing of the e¤ect. It may be the case that migrants are a¤ected by
the dynamics of their countrys economic performances more than its actual level. We introduce
the potential role of GDP growth, GDP , alone or together with GDPh;t (columns 1 and 2 of
Table 3). It bears negative signs, indicating that an acceleration of migrantsrelative deprivation
negatively a¤ects their well-being; yet it is not signicant. The baseline GDP e¤ect remains
signicant when introduced simultaneously with GDP growth (column 2). A more exible way to
account for dynamics is to introduce lagged GDP. Macroeconomic uctuations may be perceived
with a delay or their impact on SWB could depend on longer-term trends rather than on current
economic conditions.19 Lagged macroeconomic variables can also relate to adaptation e¤ects
(Di Tella et al. 2010, Di Tella et al., 2003), stemming from the idea that migrants may adjust
to the home country GDP after a period of time and thereafter only derive negative positional
level shocks or social multipliers (peer e¤ects) in happiness.
18Sample size is reduced given the fact that the "big ve" are available for only two years, so that linking them to
past years through panel identiers leads to inevitable backward attrition. Note that these traits can be considered
as an individual xed e¤ect as they are shown to be constant over time (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2012).
19The timing of measurement of GDP and SWB variables may also be an issue. SWB information is collected
mostly in the rst half of the year (Spiess and Kroh, 2004); however, it is unlikely that migrants have good
anticipation about the overall level of GDP in their home country for the current year. It might be reasonable to
consider that GDPh;t 1 is more closely associated with migrantsperception.
16
feelings from increases in GDP. Columns 3 and 4 show results with 1-year and 2-year lags of GDP
respectively. Di Tella et al. (2010) interpret the sum of lagged e¤ects as the amount of adaptation.
We observe that lagged GDP e¤ects change sign and are insignicant; yet an F-test of whether
the joint e¤ect of all GDP variables (i.e., current or lagged) is zero can be rejected. With one
lag (two lags), 26% (14%) of an initial increase of GDP is lost over the ensuing year(s), leaving
a long lasting e¤ect of  :310 ( :384) on SWB, which is very similar to our baseline result. In
terms of equivalent income, the cumulated e¤ects of current and lagged GDP are  :79 ( :98)
with one lag (two lags), again similar to the baseline. We draw two lessons from these results.
First, it is obviously not possible to identify the precise timing due to the high correlation between
GDPh;t, GDPh;t 1 and GDPh;t 2. This is no impediment to our analysis, as cumulated e¤ects
do not change our conclusions. Second, we nd no evidence of an adaptation e¤ect to individual
positional concerns towards the home country. If any, this is a very partial adaptation process,
which is consistent with the ndings in Di Tella et al. (2010) or Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag
(2008). These authors show that while people adapt almost fully to changes in absolute living
standards, they do not (or only partly) adapt to changes in status.
E¤ect of GDP: Home versus Host Regions. Baseline estimations reveal the existence of
highly signicant status concerns with respect to home country GDP per capita. Let us view
them in a broader perspective using a stylized model inspired by Clark et al. (2008). Assume
that an individuals SWB depends on her income, y, the mean income of her local reference group
(destination country or region), yl, and the mean income of her external reference (origin country
or region), ye, so that:
SWB = 1 ln(y) + 2 ln(
y
yl
) + 3 ln(
yl
ye
)
= (1 + 2) ln(y) + (3   2) ln(yl)  3 ln(ye):
We have mentioned Akay et al. (2012) who unveil migrantsstrong competing feelings toward their
rural regions of origin ( 3 < 0) in the case of internal migrants in China. This study also showed
that migrants experience a positive feeling from the mean income of the urban regions where
they stay (3   2 > 0). This last result was interpreted as a signal e¤ect, meaning that urban
residentshigher incomes may be informative about migrantsown future income (see also, Senik,
2004, 2008; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000). We can test similar e¤ects with international migrants
if we dispose of enough variation in regions of origin, as we have exploited in the present study,
and regions of destination. For the latter, however, all migrants in our sample live in Germany.
Nonetheless, we can exploit variation in economic performances across German regions. We do
so by collecting regional statistics at a fairly disaggregated level, namely 96 German districts
known as ROR (Raumordnungsregionen). We match unique information about ROR economic
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performances with our micro data.20
We rst replace our usual GDP measure by the di¤erence GDPh;t   GDPROR;t. The former
component, the usual log real GDP per capita of home country h, is a proxy for log mean income
of the external reference group, ln(ye). The latter, corresponding to the log real GDP per capita of
the ROR where the migrant lives in year t, is a proxy for the log mean income of the local reference,
ln(yl). Results in column 5 of Table 3 show a negative and highly signicant e¤ect of the relative
home country GDP per capita. In a more exible specication, we separately introduce GDPh;t
and GDPROR;t. Results in column 6 conrm that the e¤ect of home country GDP per capita,
 3 in the simple model above, is negative and of very similar magnitude as in the baseline
( :207). ROR information is unfortunately limited to 12 years, 1998-2009, which reduces the
sample to around 21; 145 migrant-year observations. As a result, the e¤ect is insignicant in this
specication (an additional, unreported estimation of the baseline model, i.e. with GDPh;t only,
on this sub-sample yields a similar GDP e¤ect of  :213 with a p-value of :17). Nonetheless, the
e¤ect of ROR-level German GDP, 3   2, is positive and signicant (:163), which is consistent
with an interpretation in terms of signal e¤ect. That is, while we already control for the absolute
economic performance of each migrant through her income and labor market status, local economic
conditions may additionally be perceived as a reection of individual future prosperity and a¤ect
migrantswell-being positively.21
Price E¤ects. In place of real GDP, it would make sense to include log nominal GDP per
capita, denoted GDP nomh;t , to check if migrants are to some extent victims of monetary illusion.
Yet, since GDP nomh;t = Pht + GDPh;t, with Pht as the log price index (log GDP deator), we can
simply introduce the latter in the SWB regression together with GDPh;t. Column 7 in Table 3
shows that the e¤ect of log real GDP per capita is unchanged while the log price level has no
signicant e¤ect. This conveys that real GDP is what truly matters for well-being. If this is the
case, an alternative specication including log nominal GDP per capita, GDP nomh;t , and log prices
should give a negative coe¢ cient on the former and a positive coe¢ cient, of similar magnitude,
on prices. That is, migrants should be a¤ected by the success of their home country in terms of
20Each ROR is a spatially organized unit based on various criteria to represent local markets (Knies and Spiess,
2007). Regional GDP per capita is drawn from o¢ cial statistics, which substantially attenuates measurement
error issues. Details about ROR data are available at http://www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/Veroe entlichun-
gen/INKAR/inkar node.html.
21To some extent, this result is reminiscent of that in Di Tella et al. (2002) who nd that citizens are positively
a¤ected by the economic performances of the country/region where they live, possibly through feelings of identity
and national prestige. In the same vein, a positive relative concern at a more local level can be interpreted as
a sign of tight community ties and altruistic preferences. Evidence exists for poor rural households (for instance in
South Africa, see Kingdon and Knight, 2007). This interpretation is less likely to apply to our migrants, even if it
remains a possibility, and the signal e¤ect seems to us a better explanation in the present context.
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nominal GDP, but they should also know that a price increase in their home country reduces their
relative deprivation as it decreases the relative cost of living in Germany. This is indeed what we
nd in column 8. Even if not a denitive proof, this evidence is suggestive that migrants do not
su¤er from monetary illusion (see also Deckers et al., 2011, using regional price variation within
Germany and Di Tella et al., 2010, on measuring aversion to monetary ination using SWB).22
Table 3: E¤ect of Home-country GDP on Migrant SWB: Micro Data (cont.)
SWB micro estimations
GDP -0.312 *** -0.421 * -0.448 * -0.207 -0.281 ***
(0.117) (0.216) (0.229) (0.158) (0.104)
Nominal GDP -0.287 ***
(0.104)
ΔGDP -0.138 -0.130
(0.166) (0.166)
GDP (t-1) 0.111 0.296
(0.188) (0.288)
GDP (t-2) -0.231
(0.184)
GDP(home) - GDP(Germany) (a) -0.169 ***
(0.059)
GDP (Germany) (a) 0.163 **
(0.064)
Prices (GDP deflator) 0.066 0.347 *
(0.151) (0.178)
GDP (equivalent income) -0.793 -1.070 -1.144 -0.570 -0.713
GDP (equiv. inc. cumulated) -0.789 -0.978
R2 or pseudo-R2 0.284 0.284 0.284 0.285 0.324 0.324 0.284 0.284
# observations 47,557 47,557 47,557 47,557 21,145 21,145 47,557 47,557
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Linear estimations performed on migrants from 24 countries over 26 years. GDP
refers to log of real GDP per capita, taken from World Bank indicators. Subjective well-being (SWB) taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel. (a)
GDP(Germany) refers to the log GDP per capita of at the district (ROR) level. All models include the full set observed characteristics reported in appendix
Table A.2, as well as quasi-fixed effects (QFE), Cohort fixed effects (10 arrival cohorts), state effects (16 federal states of Germany), year fixed effects and
home country fixed effects.
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Unemployment. We nally turn to the e¤ect of home country unemployment rates. We rst
use a simple linear model without QFE. Column A in Table 4 reports a positive and signicant
e¤ect, about a third or a fourth of the size found in grouped estimations. Column B presents
results when unemployment and GDPh;t are introduced simultaneously. The relation between
unemployment (resp. GDPh;t) and migrantsSWB is still positive (resp. negative) and signicant.
22Other interpretations should nonetheless be mentioned. In particular, migrants from countries with lower
relative prices could take advantage of the relative higher purchasing power of their income when they go home on
holidays. In this case, higher prices in the home country should decrease rather than increase SWB, an e¤ect that
may partly counteract the relative concern e¤ect described above. Note, however, that migrants could equally go
to any other low-price country to take advantage of their German salaries.
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This result implies that the level of unemployment in the home country is another reference
standard, conditional on the migrants work status. Yet, we notice that when individual e¤ects
are introduced (columns C and D), the unemployment e¤ect becomes smaller and insignicant
(the GDP e¤ect is basically unchanged). A less pronounced unemployment e¤ect (compared to
the GDP e¤ect) could be explained by the fact that it is the mixture of two opposite forces:
competing feelings with home countries (as in the GDP e¤ect) but also an opposite e¤ect related
to migrants own labor market prospects in case of return migration. Another explanation is
the fact that informal work might be a more relevant measure than unemployment for the poor
countries sending migrants to Germany. Finally, columns E and F show results with 1-year and
2-year lagged unemployment rates respectively. While estimates are usually insignicant, their
cumulative e¤ects amount to an order of magnitude close to a contemporary e¤ect (between :005
and :008), which is consistent with the lack of adaptation to relative labor market status discussed
above and established in Di Tella et al. (2010) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag (2008).
Table 4: E¤ect of Home-country Unemployment on Migrant SWB: Micro Data
SWB micro estimations
Unemployment rates 0.011 *** 0.009 ** 0.006 0.004 0.009 0.011 *
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Unemployment rate (t-1) -0.002 0.004
(0.006) (0.009)
Unemployment rate (t-2) -0.010
(0.007)
GDP -0.374 *** -0.376 ***
(0.115) (0.144)
Individual effects (a) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects (b) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects (c) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.289 0.289 0.284 0.284 0.284 0.285
#Observations 47,557 47,557 47,557 47,557 47,398 47,231
E F
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Linear estimations performed on migrants from 24
countries over 26 years. All models include the full set observed characteristics reported in appendix Table A.2. Unemployment
rates and GDP (referring to log of real GDP per capita) are taken from World Bank indicators. Subjective well-being (SWB) taken
from the German Socio-Economic Panel. Other controls include: (a) Unobserved individual effects modeled as quasi-fixed effects
(QFE), (b)  10 arrival cohort effects, (c) 16 federal states of Germany.
A B C D
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Origin Country and Year Selection. We investigate the sensitivity of our results to country
and year selection. First, the Turkish migrants are by far the largest group among all migrants
in Germany (25:1% of the total foreign population, see Table A.1). We check whether results still
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hold without this group and whether time variation within this group alone generates the e¤ect.
Results are reported in columns (a) and (b) of Table 5. The e¤ect of GDPh;t is negative and
signicant. It is very similar to the baseline in the model without Turkey, conveying that results
are not driven by Turkish migrants alone. It is larger, but less precisely estimated, when using
only time variation among Turkish migrants.23
Next, we check whether the e¤ect varies with the geographical distance to Germany. Closer
countries are in general richer (so that the rate through which they may converge towards German
GDP is lower), as well as more politically and economically integrated. Hence, the e¤ect may not
be as pronounced as with Eurasian countries. Countries located farther away also make circular
migration more di¢ cult, especially in the early years of our panels during which possibilities of
air travel were not as developed as today. Columns (c) and (d) in Table 5 show estimates using a
threshold of 2; 100 kilometers from Germany (the median), which excludes countries like Turkey,
Iran, Ukraine and Russia. As conformed to intuition, the e¤ect is larger in the more distant group,
but not signicantly so, compared to countries in the vicinity of Germany.
Finally, we verify if selected years also make a di¤erence. As previously seen in Figure 1, most
countries in our sample experience economic growth for a majority of the years 1984-2009. We
investigate whether our results are driven by these episodes of growth or whether recession years
tell us a similar story. While upturns in home countries are expected to trigger relative concerns
among migrants, downturns may have an asymmetrical e¤ect if migrants experience more sym-
pathy toward their nation during bad years. We interact macroeconomic conditions with dummy
variables for upward or downward changes in these variables. The results are reported in columns
(e) and (f) of Table 5. Both upward and downward changes in the home country GDP a¤ect
migrantswell-being. While the e¤ect generated by economic downturns in home countries is
smaller, as conjectured above, the di¤erence with upturns is neither large nor signicant. More
asymmetry is observed on the side of unemployment rates (not reported): the e¤ect in this case
is signicant for growth years but not for recession years. Column (g) examines the impact of the
recent economic crisis. Results do not greatly vary from the baseline after excluding the years 2008
and 2009 from our sample. Additional unreported results show little contrast between migrants
living in East and West Germany. We also nd that excluding East Germany does not a¤ect our
conclusions.
Destination Country. Previous checks varied the selection of origin countries. Of course it
would be interesting to also change the destination country. Our data requirement consisted in
23The e¤ect of the unemployment rate is also comparable to the baseline, yet it is not signicant in the reported
estimates, possibly due to smaller sample size. It is nonetheless signicant in a less demanding specication without
individual QFE.
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Table 5: E¤ect of Home-country Macroeconomics on Migrant SWB: Sensitivity Check
trends
GDP -0.285 ** -0.477 * -0.262 ** -0.331 ** -0.280 *** -0.254 ** -0.210 ** -0.255 **
(0.111) (0.260) (0.110) (0.160) (0.106) (0.113) (0.106) (0.126)
GDP (equiv. Income) -0.784 -1.361 -0.703 -0.888 -0.713 -0.647 -0.531 -0.645
R2 0.286 0.269 0.284 0.284 0.284 0.289 0.283 0.191
# obs. 31,303 16,254 47,557 47,557 47,557 47,557 44,831 6,555
All countries
but Turkey
Checking for
asymmetrical effects:
trends
<median >median
(d)
Without
recession years
2008-2009
Distance to GermanyOnly
Turkey upward downward
(h)
Results for
the UK
(BHPS)
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Estimations include all personal characteristics, individual effects (QFE),
year fixed effects, home country fixed effects, cohort effects and German state effects (British districts in column h). GDP denotes log real GDP per
capita.
(e) (f) (g)(a) (b) (c)
the search of a country with a large and diverse migrant population, for which long panels were
available and with information on SWB and macroeconomic conditions. The GSOEP veried
these conditions and has therefore been used for our main analysis. Nonetheless, we suggest here
a tentative robustness check using another country, the UK. This country is characterized by a very
di¤erent immigration history compared to Germany, with substantial migration ows since 1945
from the Republic of Ireland and from the former colonies and territories of the British Empire
such as India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Caribbean, South Africa, Kenya and Hong Kong. More
recent immigration concerns workers from Central and Eastern Europe following the accession to
the European Union of eight countries from this region. A bit less than 5 million people living
in the UK are foreign-born. We retain data from migrants present in the BHPS over the years
1991-2008 and for 26 countries of origin (we keep countries with enough observations). Once
discarding migrants for whom SWB information is missing, we are left with 6; 555 migrantyear
observations. While this is a much smaller sample than in our analysis on German data, the
results of the baseline model reported in column (h) of Table 5 are striking. The GDP e¤ect is
again negative and signicant, of a magnitude very much in line with what we found for Germany.
Results for the UK may be seen as suggestive evidence, given the lower data quality. They
nonetheless indicate that the ndings for Germany can be generalized. Further research should
attempt to replicate this approach to many more countries.
Non-Economic Outcomes. We have narrowed our empirical quest to the e¤ect of economic
conditions in home countries on SWB. While the impact may well be due to motives of relative
deprivation/concerns, as we argued, these may not extend to non-economic dimensions. We
have speculated above that shocks to the home country of a non-economic nature may evoke the
expected sympathy with the origin country and thus have an opposite e¤ect. We now test this
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hypothesis by using a series of three indicators related to actual and potential conicts as well as
long-term life conditions in the home country. Precisely, we perform separate estimations of the
e¤ect of battle-related deaths (log number of people), military expenditures (in % of GPD) and life
expectancy (number of years) on migrantsSWB, using the same controls as in the baseline model.
We nd estimates of  0:014 (standard error of :006),  :050 (:011) and :014 (:009) respectively,
i.e. signicant e¤ects which denote migrantsfeelings of sympathy towards their home countries
when it comes to non-economic domains. When we include these variables together with GDPh;t,
their coe¢ cients are basically unchanged while the GDP e¤ect is very similar to our usual results,
i.e. a signicant negative e¤ect.
3.4 Alternative Interpretations
Di Tella et al. (2003) discuss the possible endogeneity of national GDP e¤ects on citizenslife
satisfaction. They reckon that it is di¢ cult to nd believable macroeconomic instruments and
suggest to instead experiment with di¤erent forms of lag structures. In the present context,
there is much less concern for endogeneity given the minimal inuence of migrants on their home
countrys GDP. Nonetheless, relative changes in home country GDP may a¤ect migrants through
three other channels besides positional concerns, namely migration ows, remittances and the
option to return home. We now investigate whether these variables challenge our interpretations
by responding themselves to country-of-origin conditions.
Inow of Country-Fellows. A potential e¤ect of bad economic conditions in the home country
is that more potential immigrants from that country may be interested to migrate to Germany.
Possibly they migrate to the same regions where their co-nationals already live. In this case,
an increased ow of new migrants may enhance the well-being of existing migrants. Additional,
unreported estimations depart from our baseline model by including the proportion of immigrants
in local labor markets. They show no e¤ect of the latter while the e¤ect of GDPh;t is basically
unchanged. This is also true when we include ROR xed e¤ects to account for time-invariant
labor market conditions and capture changes in migrantsproportions (see Akay et al., 2013, for a
more detailed analysis). More generally, the formation of enclaves requires long lasting dynamics,
probably mixing people of di¤erent nationalities. Also, migration inows cannot respond freely
to changes in home country economic conditions simply because of changes in migration policies.
While the earlier cohorts of immigrants in Germany were attracted by the guest workersprogram,
immigration became more restricted after the program was formally closed in 1973 (immigration
to guest workers regions continued through other channels such as family reunication but became
more strictly regulated).
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Return Migration. A second channel is return migration, which we treat as a more serious
challenger in terms of result interpretation. Indeed, the potential return decision concerns each
migrant directly. We rst empirically check whether return migration depends on changes in the
home countriesmacroeconomic performances.24 We suggest the following model:
riht = 1(Xit: + :Macroht + i + h + t + iht > 0); (3)
where riht is an indicator variable taking value 1 if migrant i from country h leaves Germany in
year t (and drops from the panel for this reason), and 0 otherwise. The model combines individual
characteristics, Xit, including cohort and state xed e¤ects, a macroeconomic index of the home
country, Macroht, individual e¤ects (modeled as QFE), i, country and time xed e¤ects, h
and t respectively, and an i.i.d. normally distributed random term. Appendix Table A.3 (left
panel) reports estimates of  for our usual macroeconomic variables (log real GDP per capita
and unemployment rates), either contemporaneous, lagged or lagged time variation. Estimates
are obtained in each case with a separate regression.25 Results suggest that home country GDP
increases the probability of return but is not signicant. We obtain the same conclusion with
lagged GDP. Only the lagged change in GDP, i.e., GDPh;t 1 GDPh;t 2, is found to signicantly
a¤ect the probability of return in year t. We also nd no e¤ect of current or previous year
unemployment rates on the decision to return.
Next, we re-estimate SWB regressions accounting for possible return and non-random sample
attrition due to return migration  as a function of home country macroeconomic conditions.
We use the Heckman procedure adapted to panel data by simultaneously estimating selection
into return migration and the SWB equation by Maximum Likelihood (for a more structural
approach, see Bellemare, 2007). Ideally, the selection equation should contain an instrument
explaining variation in migrantslikelihood to return but uncorrelated with (conditional) migrants
SWB. There is no obvious variable of the kind, as virtually everything can potentially a¤ect well-
being. We use a rst series of instruments based on the migrants declared intention to stay in
Germany (contemporaneous, lagged and time change of this intention). We also follow Dustmann
et al. (1998) by using the average intention to stay over all migrants household members (also as
contemporaneous, lagged or time di¤erence), which is expected to be more exogenous but possibly
24A rare feature of the GSOEP is the considerable e¤ort put into investigating the causes of panel attrition in a
whereabouts-study. This means one can distinguish between households moving within Germany and households
going abroad (which we dene as return migration) from other attrition causes.
25In these estimations, other determinants of return migration are in line with intuition (detailed estimates
available from the authors). In particular, the probability of return increases very signicantly when the spouse
and close relatives remain in the home country, with the level of remittances and with declared intention to
stay. Conversely, the probability of return decreases signicantly with years since migration or when migrants are
refugees.
24
less relevant as an instrument. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 report the estimates of the di¤erent
instruments and of GDPh;t on the propensity to return. All instruments have a signicant impact
and the expected sign (F-tests pass the threshold of 10 commonly used for checking if instruments
are weak). The third column shows that GDPh;t once again has a positive but insignicant e¤ect
on the probability of return. The rst column of Table 6 reports the e¤ect of GDPh;t on migrants
SWB when controlling for selection into return migration. It is very much in line with baseline
results and signicant in all cases. The correlation  between the residuals of the two equations is
signicantly di¤erent from zero only when the instrument used is the contemporaneous intention
to stay (the migrants intention or the mean answer for her family).
Remittances. Remittances constitute a third channel linking migrants to their home countries.
Remittances sent by migrants can directly a¤ect home country macroeconomic conditions and
inuence, at the same time, their own well-being. The latter e¤ect is of signicant magnitude
only for a limited set of countries and years. This concerns especially Turkey, given the size of its
migrant community in Germany. For instance in 2002, remittances sent by Turkish migrants living
in Germany accounted for 0:4% of the total GDP of Turkey. We have checked above that our
results are not driven by this country, however. Moreover, our GDP measure already includes total
annual remittances received by migrants from Germany and from all other destination countries.26
We further explore the e¤ect of GDP variation on migrant SWB through the channel of remit-
tances. First, if per capita income in the home country increases, migrants may need to compensate
their relatives left behind less and, hence, their SWB would increase (a downward bias on our
e¤ect). To check this, we have run estimations of the probability to send remittances on individual
characteristics, as specied in the right panel of Appendix Table A.3. In this table, we report the
e¤ect of macroeconomic variables only. It shows that the probability of remitting signicantly
depends on the contemporaneous level of unemployment but not on the current GDP level nor
on lagged variables. Second, even if the remittance levels do not respond much to home country
economic conditions, their implicit value may change with it. If economic conditions improve,
migrantsstatus may decrease to the extent that their role as supporting their extended family
or local communities in the origin region becomes less prominent (an upward bias of our e¤ect).
Conversely, worse conditions could increase the purchasing power/value of any amount of remit-
tance sent to the country of origin, and be a source of increased well-being for immigrants thereof.
Replicating our estimations on migrants who do not send remittances provides results that are
very similar to the baseline, however. This conveys that the channel of remittances does not a¤ect
26Specic information on remittances sent by migrants in Germany to various home countries could be collected
to account for the direct variation in GDP due to remittances in SWB regressions. Note that this is already
captured by country-year dummies in our augmented specication and that our main results were hardly changed
in this case.
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our results nor our interpretation in terms of relative concerns/deprivation. Finally, it is worth
noting that while our baseline estimations already control for the amount of remittances sent by
migrants, we nd hardly any di¤erence in terms of both GDP and unemployment e¤ects whether
we include this variable or not.
Table 6: SWB Estimations Corrected for Selection into Return Migration
# obs.
Instrument: Migrant's intention to stay
Intention (t) -0.245 *** -0.395 *** 0.065 0.085 ** 47,568
(0.095) (0.019) (0.134) (0.036)
Intention (t-1) -0.314 *** -0.336 *** 0.116 0.007 40,961
(0.099) (0.021) (0.146) (0.036)
Intention (t) - Intention (t-1) -0.316 *** -0.064 *** 0.094 -0.005 40,961
(0.099) (0.021) (0.145) (0.038)
Intention (t-1) - Intention (t-2) -0.254 ** -0.052 ** 0.100 -0.021 35,664
(0.105) (0.022) (0.157) (0.043)
Instrument: mean intention to stay of migrant's household
Intention (t) -0.249 *** -0.460 *** 0.071 0.062 * 47,568
(0.095) (0.021) (0.135) (0.034)
Intention (t-1) -0.316 *** -0.397 *** 0.123 -0.008 40,961
(0.099) (0.023) (0.146) (0.035)
Intention (t) - Intention (t-1) -0.316 *** -0.086 *** 0.092 -0.005 40,961
(0.099) (0.024) (0.145) (0.038)
Intention (t-1) - Intention (t-2) -0.254 ** -0.066 *** 0.099 -0.021 35,664
(0.105) (0.026) (0.157) (0.043)
Coeff. on
instrument
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. SWB equation estimated linearly on microdata using baseline
specification and additionally accounting for Heckman correction for non-random selection into return migration (ML estimation). Selection
based on a dummy variable for return migration. Different rows report results for alternative instruments in the selection equation.
Instruments are based on the migrant's intention to stay or her household mean intention to stay. Rho is the correlation between the two
equations.
SWB estimation with Heckman
correction for return migration
RhoCoeff. on GDPCoeff. on GDP
Propensity to return equationSWB equation
3.5 Heterogeneity among Migrants
We now examine how the migration history of migrants and their connection to home countries may
a¤ect the results. To capture migrantsheterogeneity, we linearly interact the main macroeconomic
variable, log real GDP per capita, with a series of characteristics Hit. In other words, we replace
 by 0 + Hit in model (2). Variables in Hit include migrantsduration of stay (years-since-
migration) and a set of characteristics on intentions to stay in Germany, objective and subjective
measures of assimilation and attachment to host versus home countries.
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Duration of Stay. We rst check how duration into migration inuences the GDP e¤ect.
We use a exible specication with four groups of year-since-migration interacted with the GDP
coe¢ cient, namely less than 10 years, 10-20 years, 20-30 years and more than 30 years. The
results are reported in Figure 3. The e¤ect of the home country GDP per capita is negative and
very large ( :531) in the rst 10 years, further decreases during the next 10 years after arrival
( :635), then becomes virtually zero in the following years (i.e., positive but insignicant). That
the e¤ect of the home country GDP only a¤ects migrantsSWB in the rst 20 years after arrival
can be interpreted in ve di¤erent and non-exclusive ways: (i) after some years, as migrants
assimilate into the host country, the e¤ect of the home country GDP as a reference group fades
away; (ii) migrants who arrived young in the host countries are more assimilated and ignore their
home country as a reference point; (iii) the composition of the migrant community changes over
time due to cohort e¤ects (new comers, migrating due to family reunication, are less likely to
assimilate compared to rst round migrants who were more economically assimilated, cf. Borjas,
1999); (iv) the composition of the migrant community changes over time due to return migration
(those experiencing greater relative concerns are more likely to eventually return to their home
countries and disappear from our panel); (v) relative concerns are replaced by a signal e¤ect as
migrants get closer to a potential return to their home countries (when this moment occurs, the
success of their home country becomes a signal of their own future prosperity, cf. Senik, 2004,
2008; Akay et al. 2012; and our previous discussion).
While it is not possible to discriminate completely between these interpretations, we argue in
favor of explanations (i) and (ii). Our reasoning is as follows. First, regarding (iii), it is true that
the historical patterns of migration to Germany shows large variation over time. The majority
of earlier cohorts of immigrants moved to Germany through the bilateral guest-worker programs
from partner countries such as Turkey, Italy and Greece. Thus, one may argue that the nature of
the migrants may have changed over time. Yet, we control for unobservable di¤erences between
di¤erent migrant cohorts by using arrival cohort xed e¤ects in our baseline estimations. We also
control for individual heterogeneity among all migrants regarding their economic assimilation by
including labor market outcomes in the regression as well as individual xed e¤ects.27
Second, explanations (iv) and (v) are related to return migrants. A possible confounding factor
is the mere fact that return migration may depend on the di¤erential GDP between Germany
and the home countries. We have formally investigated this issue in the previous sub-section and
found that accounting for non-random return migration did not change our result at the mean.
In addition, the short-dashed line in Figure 3 plots the GDP e¤ect estimated on a sub-sample
27Nonetheless, a composition e¤ect due to cohort heterogeneity is complementary to the rst two explanations
since "cohortsquality" in (iii) and years-since-migration in (i) or age in (ii) all act in the same way, i.e., contribute
to create heterogeneity among migrants in terms of their degree of assimilation.
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Figure 3: E¤ects of Home GDP versus Local German GDP on migrants SWB according to
Years-since-Migration
excluding all the observations for those who return to home countries at some point in the panel
(930 return migrants over the period of study and 6; 118 individual-year observations). The results
are basically unchanged. The overall e¤ect for "stayers" is slightly lower ( :256) than for the whole
sample ( :288), yet the di¤erence is not at all signicant. Hence, we conclude that the inuence
of returns, either through a composition e¤ect (iv) or a switch to a signal e¤ect when the time of
return migration has come (v), is negligible. It is more likely due to an assimilation process (i) in
which migrants gradually abandon the home country as a primary comparator.
Assimilation and Connection with Home Countries. To go one step further, we explore
the nature and the implications of such an assimilation process that could explain the pattern
in Figure 3. First, in a close interpretation (ii) mentioned above, the lower e¤ects for those who
have stayed longer could simply reect the fact that they arrived when they were children and,
hence are more closely attached to Germany and disconnected from home countries. Therefore,
we have interacted GDP with dummies for the age range at which migrants arrived in Germany:
as children (under 12), as teenagers (12-18), as young adults (18-39) or older. Results are not
inconsistent with this explanation. While those who arrived as children are not a¤ected by home
country GDP, the GDP e¤ect remains signicant at older ages (12-18 and 18-39). An exception
is the last group, those arrived at age 40+, for which the condence interval fans out due to a
smaller sample size.
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Second, the assimilation process may have more implications than just "forgetting" home coun-
tries. It may also imply a switch in the reference group over time, with the local group becoming
the new natural comparator for long-term migrants. If this is the case, the e¤ect of German ROR-
level GDP may be expected to become insignicant or even negative as the signal e¤ect exhausts
over time and is replaced by relative concerns vis-à-vis the migrants new local environment. The
purple curve in Figure 3 shows this, i.e. a decline of the signal e¤ect over time, symmetrically
to the decline in competing feelings vis-à-vis home countries. We believe that such suggestive
evidence of a switch in reference groups is original in the literature.
Third, we investigate the assimilation interpretation in a more qualitative way. We estimate the
potential heterogeneity of the GDP e¤ect among migrants by using di¤erent proxies for their
connection to home countries. If the assimilation story suggested to explain patterns in Figure 3
is relevant, we should nd that migrants with little attachment to the home land, high degrees
of assimilation in Germany or no intention to return show more moderate relative concerns.
Therefore, we use a rst variable to refer to the presence of a close family member who stayed
behind. We also use subjective information on migrantsattachment to the host country ("Do
you feel like a German?") and more objective measures of socio-cultural assimilation (language
skills in both speaking and writing). We recover information on whether migrants have purchased
their German dwelling, which may indicate a long-term commitment to stay. We nally use
information about the intention to migrate back (using the variable mentioned above, we identify
individuals who desire to stay forever in Germany as intentionally "permanent migrants" and the
remaining ones as temporary migrants). Results are reported in Figure 4. The e¤ect of GDP
per capita on migrant SWB is ordered, for each of the questions above, from the highest to the
lowest connection to the home country. Strikingly, all questions point to the same conclusion:
Migrants characterized by high connection with their home lands through having close relatives
staying in the home country, low sentiment toward Germany, low social-cultural assimilation, or
greater intentions to return show greater relative concerns. Admittedly, the di¤erence with other
migrants is not signicant when each item is taken separately. A joint test of all the characteristics
is however signicant, and the fact that all measures point to the same direction corroborates our
interpretation: those who lose touch with the home land, intentionally or not, also treat it less as
a reference point. This is highly consistent with the time pattern discussed above.28
28Additional results (available from the authors) on heterogeneous e¤ects according to years-since-migration
show similar patterns for migrants in the intermediate group (between 10 and 20 years of migration), which are the
years during which relative concerns are the largest. For the early years (less than 10 years since migration), the
pattern is also similar for questions regarding family members staying in the home country, language prociency or
intentions to return. We have also interacted GDP with other characteristics like gender, education level, refugee
status, sending remittances, age and marital status. While women and refugees have slightly more relative concern,
we did not nd any signicant di¤erences between types or pattern that could easily be interpreted.
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Figure 4: E¤ect of Home GDP on Migrant SWB: Heterogeneity
4 Concluding Discussion
In this study, we investigate whether a countrys macroeconomic performances matter for those
who have left the country. Using various groups of migrants in Germany observed over more than
a quarter of a century, we nd a signicant and negative (positive) e¤ect of home country GDP
per capita (unemployment rate) on migrantsreported well-being. This result is robust to controls
for observed and unobserved individual characteristics alongside various xed e¤ects for location
in Germany, migration cohorts, home country, observation period and home country-specic time
trends. The relation is causal and well explained by positional concerns and the related idea
of relative deprivation of international migrants. Migrants leave their country to improve living
conditions, potentially in relation to what they could have achieved in the home land.
The relationship between macroeconomic conditions in the home country and migrant SWB con-
tribute to the so-called Easterlin Paradox (Easterlin, 1995). This paradox, i.e., the fact that SWB
has not increased over the past 30 years despite substantial economic growth, is partly explained
by relative concerns.29 Our results very vividly illustrate the role of relative concerns in the case
of migrants, consistent with the intuition of authors in the migration literature (for instance Stark
and Taylor, 1991). For migrants, SWB trends are not even at but SWB actually decreases as
29Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) nd evidence that well-being has continued to grow with GDP, downplaying the
Easterlin paradox. This is debated by Easterlin (2013) who argues that GDP and SWB are positively correlated
only in the short-run while the correlation is nil in the long-term.
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home countries do catch up with German GDP per capita. We demonstrate in this study that
these trends in SWB and home GDP are not just two unrelated time trends: they are causally
linked by the fact that origin countriesperformances are a reference against which migrants assess
their own well-being. Symmetrically, destination regions provide a signal of future prosperity as
we nd that migrantswell-being increases with local German GDP (disaggregated regional infor-
mation). We also show that both relative concerns towards home countries and the signal e¤ects
from migration regions are stronger upon arrival or for those with a low degree of assimilation
in Germany. These e¤ects tend to disappear as migrants lose ties with home countries and take
destination regions as new reference groups.30
We believe that these results are original and robust. While we see no strong objections against
our empirical approach, some limitations are worth mentioning in order to suggest future research
paths. First, we do not address the migration decision per se but in our empirical work, we do
control for the possibility of return migration and for other ways through which macroeconomic
performances in the home country correlates with migrantswell-being (e.g., remittances). In
addition, we acknowledge the fact that migrants are a self-selected group within their country.
Nonetheless, migrants in Germany constitute a very mixed population of guest workers, those
moving due to family reunication, refugees, among others. We thus control for these characteris-
tics in our estimations. Second, migrants may di¤er according to which regions they migrate to in
Germany. This also should be captured in the various controls that we use and notably through
the mix of cohort and region dummies. Yet, in the light of our results on the e¤ect of German
regional GDP, a more thorough investigation of destination choices is required. Third, our SWB-
based test of the "relative deprivation hypothesis" is only partial. We simply test whether the
migrants relative position with respect to her origin country as a whole proxied by GPD per
capita may have an e¤ect on her well-being (the international relative deprivation according to
Czaika and de Haas, 2012). We could not say anything about how migration improves the relative
position of a migrant or her family within the home country income distribution (i.e., the internal
relative deprivation hypothesis, as described in the studies of Stark and coauthors). Interestingly,
this hypothesis potentially generates further testable implications. In particular, it implies that
characteristics of the migrants home country income distribution will inuence the decision to
migrate (or to return). Further research should attempt to gather more specic information on a
migrants expected labor income in the home country, on her familys position within the home
country distribution and on how di¤erential income growth between host and home countries
a¤ects this position.
30Note that a similar interpretation is also suggested in Nekoei (2013), who shows that immigrantsnegative
labor supply response to dollar appreciation is less pronounced for those who stayed long in the US and with loose
ties to their home countries, i.e. a process of disintegration seen as a natural counterpart to the process of
assimilation à la Chiswick.
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Our results may have important implications for welfare measurement, labor markets and migra-
tion policy. First, our results imply that the welfare of migrants is not only a function of their
economic conditions in the host country but also of the di¤erential macroeconomic performances
between the two locations. A higher degree of socio-cultural assimilation appears to decrease the
welfare loss that the migrants experience due to such comparisons. The macroeconomic conditions
in the home country are one of the most important sources of information to make a cost-benet
calculation not only for initial migration decisions but also for return migration decisions. We could
examine how macroeconomic conditions of home countries a¤ect "circular migration", which is
an important phenomenon of the last decade (Constant et al., 2013). As noted by Clark et al.
(2008), relative concerns can also explain why migrants continue to visit their home countries:
this is when they can cash in as relatively high earners compared to those in the home country.
Second, when they essentially compare themselves to home countries rather than to local workers,
migrants are all the more willing to accept low-paid or insecure jobs in the host country as they are
less assimilated (this may be one of the contributory factors to the persistence of poverty in rich
countries, cf. Karelis, 2007). This is at least true in the short run and, as we found, independently
of education levels. It could indeed by hypothesized that low-skilled migrants from traditional
communities could consider origin communities as their reference group more seriously and more
persistently than highly skilled migrants, who are less relatively deprived in the rst place and
for whom reference group substitution is likely to occur faster due to easier economic assimilation
(Czaika and de Haas, 2012). We found however no evidence that education a¤ects the size of the
GDP e¤ect. It seems that in the longer term, a switch in reference is likely to take place also for
lower skilled migrants, which might explain why the second generation often refuses to work in
the same jobs their parents would have accepted.
Last, relative income e¤ects suggest an original way to measure assimilation in relation to migra-
tion policy. Indeed, our approach may allow for the identication of two broad types of migration
dynamics, as discussed in Clark et al. (2008). A rst group would consist of high skilled mi-
grants who voluntarily migrate and assimilate rapidly. Close to the modern brain drain view on
migration and to the type of workers that are targeted by migration policy in Canada and the
US, these migrants may not generate more migration as their reference group rapidly switches to
the host region. In contrast, a second group coming from poor regions and less easily assimilated
may keep home countries as the reference point and may try to attract other low-skill workers
from the same origin country as was the case with guest workers in Germany followed by a
second migration round for family reunication. The second round workers do not detract from
rst round migrantsown status but rather increase it by reducing the reference income they face
in the host country. The two types of migrants, associated with di¤erent income references, will
have di¤erent economic and cultural implications for the host country.
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Table A.1: Statistics
Migrants from.. (Log) RealGDP
(Log)
Nominal
GDP
Real GDP:
Country /
Germany
Unempl. rate
(%) SWB (0-10)
correlation
SWB &
GDP
correlation
SWB &
unempl.
# Obs.
(indiv. x
year)
Turkey 9.0 8.6 0.29 8.6 6.7 -0.90 -0.40 16,924
(0.2) (0.5) (0.05) (1.5) (2.0)
Italy 9.8 9.6 0.64 8.6 7.0 -0.64 -0.34 5,123
(0.1) (0.3) (0.10) (1.3) (2.0)
Greece 10.1 9.9 0.84 10.1 7.1 -0.85 0.34 7,474
(0.1) (0.3) (0.10) (1.4) (1.8)
Poland 9.4 9.3 0.42 14.5 7.0 -0.55 0.04 4,082
(0.2) (0.3) (0.08) (3.9) (1.8)
Spain 9.9 9.5 0.68 18.4 7.4 -0.86 0.56 3,139
(0.2) (0.4) (0.12) (3.6) (2.0)
Russia 9.2 9.1 0.36 8.7 7.3 -0.63 0.47 2,636
(0.2) (0.4) (0.08) (2.0) (1.7)
Kazakhstan 8.8 8.8 0.25 9.7 7.3 -0.79 0.68 2,321
(0.3) (0.4) (0.07) (2.3) (1.6)
Croatia 9.4 9.3 0.44 13.3 6.8 0.00 0.59 1,920
(0.2) (0.3) (0.08) (2.9) (1.7)
Romania 9.0 8.9 0.29 6.9 7.2 -0.14 0.09 1,754
(0.2) (0.4) (0.05) (0.9) (1.7)
Bosnia-Herzegovina 8.5 8.4 0.18 29.7 6.8 -0.61 -0.28 1,023
(0.4) (0.5) (0.05) (3.5) (1.8)
Austria 10.3 10.2 1.04 4.4 7.4 0.42 0.48 768
(0.1) (0.3) (0.14) (0.7) (1.7)
Czech Republic 9.8 9.8 0.64 6.5 6.9 0.12 -0.46 541
(0.1) (0.3) (0.09) (2.0) (1.9)
Ukraine 8.5 8.4 0.17 8.9 6.9 -0.35 0.28 515
(0.2) (0.3) (0.04) (1.9) (1.8)
USA 10.6 10.5 1.34 5.6 7.5 0.12 -0.21 381
(0.1) (0.3) (0.15) (1.3) (1.6)
France 10.2 10.1 0.95 9.7 7.0 0.09 -0.37 379
(0.1) (0.3) (0.09) (1.5) (1.7)
Netherlands 10.4 10.3 1.13 5.0 7.6 -0.17 -0.01 363
(0.1) (0.3) (0.15) (2.5) (1.3)
Hungary 9.6 9.5 0.50 6.8 6.9 0.20 0.54 320
(0.2) (0.3) (0.09) (2.6) (2.2)
Great Britain 10.3 10.2 1.03 6.2 7.2 -0.62 0.45 311
(0.1) (0.3) (0.13) (1.9) (1.8)
Macedonia 8.9 8.8 0.25 34.1 6.5 -0.12 -0.29 264
(0.1) (0.3) (0.03) (2.3) (2.0)
Slovenia 9.8 9.7 0.66 6.9 7.3 -0.51 0.26 248
(0.2) (0.3) (0.13) (1.2) (1.5)
Iran 9.1 9.0 0.30 12.3 5.8 -0.06 0.22 200
(0.1) (0.3) (0.04) (2.2) (2.3)
Philippines 7.9 7.8 0.09 8.6 7.3 -0.52 0.39 187
(0.1) (0.3) (0.01) (1.4) (1.7)
Portugal 9.9 9.8 0.71 6.2 7.5 -0.69 -0.23 170
(0.1) (0.2) (0.06) (1.7) (1.5)
Bulgaria 8.9 8.6 0.26 12.0 7.3 -0.07 -0.21 128
(0.2) (0.3) (0.05) (5.9) (1.7)
Mean / total * 9.5 9.3 0.6 10.9 7.1 -0.34 [0.46] 0.11 [-0.40] 51,171
(0.2) (0.3) (0.1) (2.2) (1.8)
Germany 10.28 10.13 8.50 6.99 334,308
(0.1) (0.3) (1.4) (1.8)
Note: GDP, unemployment and subjective well-being (SWB) figures are country average over 1984-2009. GDP (2005 PPP international dollars) and unemployment rate
(annual) taken from World Bank Indicators, SWB from the German Socio-Econmic Panel. Standard deviations in brackets. Correlation between SWB and GDP (or
unemployment rate) are calculated over the 26 years using mean SWB for each country-year. The correlations in square brackets in the Mean/Total row reflects both time and
country variation (24×26 country-year cells).
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Table A.2: Subjective Well-Being Regressions with Alternative Specications
SWB micro estimations
Personal characteristics
Log of HH income 0.390 *** 0.393 *** 0.398 *** Health: very good  (b) 2.510 *** 2.519 *** 2.516 ***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Non-employed -0.003 0.014 0.012 Log of HH size -0.315 *** -0.335 *** -0.335 ***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Unemployed -0.446 *** -0.427 *** -0.427 *** Years of education -0.004 -0.004 -0.001
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Old age/retired -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 Personal characteristics related to origin country
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) One children with the migrant 0.118 *** 0.116 *** 0.116 ***
In training/education 0.156 ** 0.154 ** 0.144 ** (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
(0.068) (0.070) (0.070) Two children with the migrant 0.161 *** 0.162 *** 0.163 ***
-0.054 -0.058 -0.059 (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) More than two children 0.251 *** 0.262 *** 0.261 ***
Log of working hours 0.042 *** 0.045 *** 0.045 *** (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) Spouse in home country -0.428 *** -0.461 *** -0.457 ***
Age/100 -3.380 *** -3.420 *** -3.729 *** (0.111) (0.113) (0.113)
(0.797) (0.799) (0.814) Other relative in home country -0.029 -0.038 -0.043
Age squared 1.727 ** 1.802 ** 2.152 ** (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
(0.819) (0.820) (0.843) Migrant is a refugee -0.033 -0.018 -0.014
Years since migration (YSM) 0.273 0.605 0.803 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
(1.084) (1.094) (1.145) Log of remittances -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
YSM squared / 100 0.029 -0.786 -1.449 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
(1.189) (1.224) (1.373) Macroeconomic conditions
Female 0.130 *** 0.132 *** 0.138 *** GDP -0.281 *** -0.224 *
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.104) (0.138)
Separated (a) -0.487 *** -0.499 *** -0.503 ***
(0.085) (0.087) (0.087) Home country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Single (a) -0.169 *** -0.177 *** -0.175 *** Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) Home country x year fixed effect No No Yes
Divorced (a) -0.346 *** -0.355 *** -0.365 *** R2 0.283 0.284 0.285
(0.078) (0.078) (0.078) # observations 47,557 47,557 47,557
Widowed (a) -0.537 *** -0.538 *** -0.557 ***
(0.092) (0.094) (0.094)
Health: poor  (b) 0.767 *** 0.767 *** 0.765 ***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Health: average  (b) 1.395 *** 1.397 *** 1.394 ***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055)
Health: good  (b) 1.950 *** 1.959 *** 1.955 *** (a) omitted category is "married"
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (b) omitted category is "very poor"
Self-employed
I0 II
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All models
include region effects (16 federal states or Länders of Germany), cohort effects (10 arrival
cohorts, 5 years apart) and individual effects (quasi-fixed effects with Mundlak's
formulation: within means of income, household size, age, remittances, education and
working hours)
0 I II
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Table A.3: Estimates for the Probabilities of Return Migration and Sending Remittances
GDP (t) 0.059 0.253
(0.135) (0.232)
GDP (t-1) 0.009 0.108
(0.134) (0.221)
GDP (t)-GDP (t-1) 0.202 0.347
(0.259) (0.426)
GDP (t-1)-GDP (t-2) 0.453 * 0.292
(0.263) (0.444)
Unemployment rate(t) 0.003 0.012
(0.005) (0.007)
Unemployment rate(t-1) 0.005 0.007
(0.005) (0.008)
Prob. of RemitProb. of Return
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Both probability of
return migration and probability of sending remittance are estimated by linear probability model
(similar results obtained using probit estimation). Estimations include all personal characteristics,
individual heterogeneity (QFE), year fixed effects, home country fixed effects, cohort and state fixed
effects. Estimates for the different macroeconomic variables are obtained with separate regressions.
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